The Liberian coup of April 12 1980

The Liberian coup of April 12 1980

Excerpts of Chapter 14 from
"VICTORY OVER DIFFICULTIES: A TRUE STORY"

By Dagbayonoh Kiah Nyanfore II, Monrovia, Liberia

INTRODUCTION

Continuing the commemoration of April 14, 1979, Rice Riot and the April 12, 1980, Coup in Liberia, the following excerpts discuss the coup and its aftermath, dealing with the military, the progressives, and the reactions. The previous excerpts talk about The Rice Riot. The narrative is from the forthcoming book, "Victory Over Difficulties, A True Story." Though the book is an autobiography of the author, it gives an accurate view and a historical analysis of Liberia since 1822 and before.

THE COUP OF APRIL 12, 1980

The advocacy of progressive Liberians at home and abroad motivated non-commissioned soldiers of the military to topple the Tolbert regime on April 12, 1980. The army killed President William Tolbert, most of his cabinet, his son, and his brother and buried them, except the son, in a mass grave like the government did the rice riot victims. The coup leaders spared Madam Ellen Johnson Sirleaf’s life and the lives of some native cabinets. The leaders put her on house arrest. They also paraded her in a military vehicle. They made her watch the execution of Tolbert’s 13 officials by a firing squad. Perhaps the officials felt surprised and betrayed seeing her while tied to the poles for execution.
At their trial, all the officials, except Frank Tolbert, the president’s brother who was the Senate pro-tempore, blamed President Tolbert for the wrongs of the government. For instance, Speaker of the House Richard Henries said the president did not listen to good advice, and corruption started from the president. But Frank Tolbert was defiant, cussing the coup makers. He criticized his brother only for being lenient and allowing country people in the government.
The president’s son, AB, hid in a foreign embassy. However, Justice Minister Chea Cheapo removed him. There is no information on how AB died. In an interview, the Tolbert family alleged that the minister requested a million dollars for Frank’s release. The family did not accommodate the request. Tied to the pole, Frank appeared exhausted as he bent his body down before the execution.
There are different views or factors regarding the coup cause.
One opinion is that Tolbert had embraced Pan-Africanism and non-alignment. In addition to breaking ties with Israel, Liberia’s relationship with America declined.
Moreover, the Tolbert administration had refused the US Rapid Deployment Force landing at the Robert International Airport in Liberia. The refusal embarrassed the CIA and the Pentagon. Further, the Liberian government wanted to renegotiate the Firestone Plantation contract for a more favorable deal. The American government was unhappy with the move.
Consequently, according to the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission report, for a regime change, the two agencies sought "to give support to Major William Jarbo." He was a Liberian who was "a US trained ranger." However, the seventeen non-commissioned soldiers circumvented the plan and staged the coup.
Others viewed that the violation of human rights by the Tolbert administration prompted the coup. The soldiers sacrificed their lives to free the progressives whom the government had imprisoned. The soldiers, all natives, were victims of Americo-Liberian rule and oppression. Native people generally suffered from this rule for over 130 years. Liberian historian Dr. Elwood Dunn and others shared this opinion.
Another opinion is that Whites engineered the takeover, and they were involved. Mrs. Victoria Tolbert, President Tolbert’s wife, indicated that she saw a White hand when her husband died.
The coup may have taken place Friday’s late-night Liberian time. It was a revolution, a drastic change of the order of things that ended Americo-Liberian/Congo minority rule in Liberia and gave birth to multi-party democracy.
We, in America, received the news of the overthrow on Saturday morning. Upon hearing the news, some members of the Liberian Community Association in Washington, DC, rushed to the chancery, the office of the Liberian Embassy, to support the coup, yet the office was closed on Saturday. The next day, which was Sunday, we went to the embassy, the Ambassador’s residence, and demanded the removal of the Ambassador, Mr. Herbert Brewer. He was calm and was not panicked about our actions. He maintained that he was still the Ambassador until he heard otherwise from the authority in Liberia. He added that, as Liberians, the embassy was our property, and we could stay as long as we wanted. But he was the Ambassador.
The Ambassador also indicated some contradictions in our behaviors. He stated some of us used the embassy phone to make private long-distance calls. He said.
"Who do you think will pay for the calls? Is it, not the government? Here you chose not to use your home phone but the embassy’s. Here you say you are happy with the change of government and are against corruption. Is not your act a corruption?’
Ambassador Brewer’s statement was embarrassing. Even though I wanted his removal, I respected his stance and honesty. Blamoh Seekie, then president of the association, grouped us into several daily units to mind the embassy. We heard unofficially that the foreign ministry had authorized Tambakai Jangaba, a ULAA leader, to temporarily head the embassy. But that authority was never confirmed. Brewer remained Ambassador for over six months, and the late Professor Joseph Guinnu replaced him.
The overthrow united MOJA and PAL. They collaborated on some progressive activities before the coup but operated under different ideologies. MOJA had Marxist tendencies, while PAL was confrontational and for social change.
The military government appointed the progressives as home ministers and inducted them into the military as majors. Togba-Nah Tipoteh became Minister of Planning and Economic Affairs; H. Boima Fahnbelleh, Jr. became Minister of Education; Gabriel Matthews, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Oscar Quiah, Minister of Local Government; Chea Cheapo, Minister of Justice; George Boley, Minister of Presidential Affairs; Samuel Jackson, Deputy Minister of Commerce; and Dew Mayson, Chairman of National Investment Commission.
ULAA sent key members to Liberia for the new government. Master Sergeant Samuel K. Doe, a Krahn, who led the coup, became head of state and chairperson of the People Redemption Council (PRC), the governing body of the junta. Bai Gbala, President of ULAA, headed the group to Liberia. Members included Tambakai Jangaba. Gbala was considered one of the well-educated Krahns, and Doe seemingly heard of him before the overthrow. The members received positions in the government as advisors to the PRC. Gbala, in particular, also served as an advisor to Doe. Jangaba, besides his leadership ability, was one of the best Liberian writers and organizers in the Diaspora. His writing and organizational skills transformed the PRC’s communication with the civilian cabinet. They helped provide the PRC with an intellectual base.
Gbala exercised tremendous influence in Liberia. Foreign supporters of the masonic craft approached him for the military regime not to abolish society. As shown, the craft has historically been a base of the settler elites’ political power. He had two telephones in his office. I was informed that some former officials sought his assistance.
Meanwhile, the position of the ULAA group created jealousy and envy. The progressives at home felt they were on the ground and suffered harassment and imprisonment from the Tolbert regime. They maintained that as ministers of the state, they should advise the PRC. They felt disappointed that the newcomers from abroad were counseling the PRC and having more influence.
In September 1980, I left my job with Fannie Mae in the Office of Corporate Planning for a consulting assignment in Liberia. After completing my work, I met with some members of the military, mainly Doe, General Thomas Quiwonkpa, and some progressives, including Tipoteh, Charles Taylor, and Dew Mayson. As discussed in Chapter 13, Taylor, chairperson of the board of ULAA, was already in Liberia when the coup occurred. He was in Liberia as a guest of the Tolbert government. Tolbert had invited him and other ULAA officials to come to Liberia to see the conditions in the country. I met Taylor at the Executive Mansion. He came from seeing Doe. He told me that the ULAA members in America were mad at him for not returning to the organization after the end of the trip. He also invited me for dinner at his house, but I was due to depart for the US and could not attend.
Also, during my visit, I accidentally met Mrs. Sirleaf. She was now released from detention and worked for the PRC government as an advisor. Later, the regime appointed her as head of the Liberian Bank for Development and Investment (LBDI). While I was walking with Tipoteh one morning on Broad Street, she and some government officials came down the street from a meeting at the Ministry of Finance. She held a conversation with Tipoteh while I looked on. I decided to pay back what she did when she ignored my presence during her meeting with Dew in Washington, DC. When she and Tipoteh had finished talking, I asked him in her presence. "Who is she"?
Tipoteh looked surprised at my question but responded.
"Ellen Sirleaf."
She interrupted.
"Nyanfore, you mean you do not know me. If you do not know me, I do not know you too".
Tipoteh stepped in and told us to stop. Tipoteh was surprised because he knew I knew or should have known her. I knew Madam Sirleaf very well, as indicated in chapter 13. I could have overlooked her behavior in DC, but I decided to give her a dose of her own medicine. Later, I felt terrible about my actions. But Ellen respects people who are not sycophants but brave and act like her.
Let me return to my visit to Liberia. I observed a problem with the progressives. The MOJA and the PAL groups were quietly competing against each other. Before the coup, MOJA saw PAL as adventurers from America. At the same time, PAL considered MOJA a mere intellectual group that was non-active regarding the Liberian issue. Through its leader Togba-Nah Tipoteh, MOJA called a press conference criticizing PAL’s plan to stage a protest against the Tolbert administration’s intention to increase the price of rice.
While MOJA and PAL progressively collaborated in some functions, the ideological conflict between the two groups continued during the overthrow. Perhaps MOJA’s reaction to the planned protest was that PAL made the announcement at a MOJA event without informing MOJA. However, these groups viewed the ULAA elements as "Johnnies Just Come." They complained about the appointment of ULAA members as advisors to the PRC.
However, the military talked of the Tolbert government’s evils and the Liberian masses’ suffering but had no plan or blueprint for where it wanted to take the country. Doe was energetic and talked militantly yet was vulnerable. The animosity between the progressives at home and those from abroad was apparent. Jangaba told me his frustration.
"When I came home, the comrades here made me feel like I was not a Liberian. Some asked me when I was going back." "They appear to forget or did not consider our advocacy in the US for the struggle in Liberia. They feel they were the only ones who fought for the cause."
Jangaba was disappointed. His view was accurate. I felt the same when I visited. Jangaba later became a senator for Cape Mount County and Senate pro-tempore during Doe’s administration.
In my discussion with the group at home during my visit, it appeared that they wanted those progressives from the Diaspora to have stayed abroad and promoted and defended the revolution internationally. But this was challenging. Liberians from abroad felt it was their right to return home to actively participate in the new government.
MOJA and PAL suspended their advocacy to focus on the running of the state. But a few months after the overthrow, the MOJA – PAL conflict resurfaced. The groups were competing for influence and power within the new government. First, while the PAL group nominated many of its comrades for positions in the Liberian Foreign Service, MOJA did little for its members. Instead, MOJA advised them to first take the civil service test and forward the results for action for appointment consideration. The Foreign Service operates under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which Gabriel Matthews, the leader of PAL, headed. Members nominated for high ambassadorial posts included Wesley Johnson and D. Kahn Carlor.
Many MOJA comrades were disappointed for not getting employment. They felt that MOJA was moderate for job placements, unlike PAL. Matthews reached out to other Liberians who were not PAL members. According to his private secretary, Charles Wilson, he wanted me to work for the foreign ministry. Matthews knew that I had studied Foreign Service. Here the foreign minister was somewhat practicable and essentially political, providing and rewarding fellow comrades with government job opportunities.
Meanwhile, MOJA was careful, proceeding with civil service regulations for the employment of its members. However, the wrong side of Matthews’ approach was that he gave jobs regardless of qualifications. Nevertheless, both groups began recruiting new members and undermining each other. Critics accused the MOJA group of recruiting its youths to send to Ethiopia for educational training through the Ministry of Education under Minister Henry Fahnbulleh, a MOJA official. It was alleged that the recruits were to undertake training in guerrilla warfare. Some observers pointed figures at PAL for formulating the accusation. The PRC government, fearful of the presumed consequence, stopped the recruitment.
MOJA had fewer comrades in the PRC regime. I visited Tipoteh’s office, and he showed me a list of vacant positions in his ministry. I asked him why he would not consider qualified progressives for the posts. His answer did not satisfy me. He seems to prefer retaining the old True Whip Party partisans. The only progressive I saw working in his office was his Special Assistant Dusty Wolokollie, who later became assistant minister for administration.
I also noticed that the MOJA leadership highly regarded those with Ph.D. There was an effort to reach out to them. As a comrade, Tipoteh visited me in Washington, DC, while planning minister. During the visit, he called Dr. Elwood Dunn repeatedly.
I asked him why you are running after Elwood.
"We have to reach out to them." He answered.
Dunn is a liberal and intellectual but not progressive, in my view. As the minister of presidential affairs of Tolbert’s administration, he ran the communication arm of the president excellently. He exhibited high professionalism in handling the letters between Tolbert and Matthews during the event before the April 1979 Rice Riot. As I indicated before, PAL was planning a public demonstration against the government’s proposed increase in rice price. Elwood did not inject himself into the communications. For example, he would reply to Matthews as below:
The president wants me to inform you that there are better ideas than insisting on a demonstration. The president thinks you should reconsider your intention and engage in a fruitful dialogue to resolve the rice matter. The president views a street protest could be dangerous.
This writing or political communication method removes the writer from the opinion. The writer becomes a mere messenger. It was a good idea for Tipoteh to reach out to Elwood but not to overdo it. Tipoteh was doing the calling. It could make him vulnerable.
During my visit to Liberia, my effort to meet with the Head of State, Doe, was difficult and frustrating. Before my trip to Liberia, a group I chaired in DC to support and defend the revolution asked me to see Doe and tell him our concerns. A primary matter was the government retaining the Ambassador in Washington, DC.
After my assignment, I tried to see Doe independently by arranging appointments at the executive mansion. Boy, I encountered so many difficulties and runarounds. Some government officials tried to block me from seeing Doe. They feared I would ask for a job and be appointed to a prominent position if I saw him. The fear was justifiable because many Liberians in the Diaspora rushed home for jobs just after the coup. As stated, many were appointed to key positions, creating a power struggle between the progressive groups.
With the help of Dew and General Thomas Quiwonpka, I got an audience with Doe. The meeting was at Doe’s private residence at the executive mansion. He was having a meeting with his father in a room. So I waited in the seating area. Soldiers guarded the area. I watched the news with them on TV. Before delivering the message to Doe when he entered, I clarified that I was not there to seek a job or position with the government. Doe jet when I made the remark. He had not heard such a bold statement from a Liberian visiting. I said it before George Boley, then minister of state for presidential affairs. I wanted him to listen to it because he was under the impression that I was seeking a job. He was one of the individuals making it difficult for me to see Doe.
I read the message in the presence of Vice-Chair Thomas Wey Seh, Justice Minister Chea Cheapo, Minister Boley, Johnnie Kapor, Assistant Minister of State and Presidential Affairs. Wey Seh was a principal participant in the coup and second in command in the PRC. After the reading, Wey Seh jumped from his seat, happily greeted me, and shook my hand. He agreed with our concern calling for the replacement of the Ambassador. Doe responded that he would see about that.
My presentation ended. Doe then told me how the military staged the coup and his role. His speech was down to earth and showed care and concern for the Liberian masses. He indicated that he ordered, and his men executed the plan for the overthrow.
Weh Sey brought up the subject of frequent auto accidents occurring with some members of the PRC. Two members had just died or had a near-fatal accident a few months after the coup. He sounded serious and suggested that the council should do something.
"We should stop driving the civilian cars. We should use army jeeps. I think they are more comfortable, and civilians would not run into us as happened with the accidents," He added. "Doe, you should consider not driving the Honda Civic. It is too small, and a civilian driver could hit you."
"I will hit the person back," Doe replied arrogantly.
"No, you cannot do that. You are the head of state," Chea Cheapo interrupted. He added, "A country leader cannot do such a thing." (Laughter)
Weh Sey turned to me. "Youngman, you’re from America. Can the Liberian Ambassador to America walk into the office of the US Vice President just like that, without prior notice"?
The question put me in politics on the ground.
I answered, "No."
I stated that usually, by protocol, the Ambassador would go through his host country’s foreign ministry or department of state for an audience with the vice president. Or if the two officials are friends, their respective staff can arrange the meeting. However, the state department would be aware.
"I see," Weh Sey acknowledged.
The vice chair appeared quite annoyed, complaining about the disrespect to his office by what he called the unannounced visits of the American Ambassador. But Liberia is considered American Stepchild, and things may go by the US wishes.
Doe spoke on American-Liberian affairs. "Those people do not care about us. They are just for themselves. Look how long we have been their friends, over 130 years; Liberia is still underdeveloped. They help Israel far more than they assist us. The only thing we have is the American dollars, which they control," he said.
Wey Sey nodded his head in agreement. I got concerned about Doe’s view. To me, he was getting radical at an early stage.
I said to myself. "Doe needs to tone down his US stance, particularly as a new third-world leader and considering America’s stronghold on Liberia. Security in Liberia was fragile then; the progressives were relatively divided. Further, the US presidential election was a few months away. Ronald Reagan, a conservative and Republican, was running against incumbent President Jimmy Carter, a moderate Democrat. Reagan portrayed Carter as a weak leader who did not take a tougher position on Iran and the Soviet Union. Indeed, during Carter’s presidency, Iran took American diplomats’ hostage in Tehran. US public opinion polls showed Reagan was leading. Reagan would not tolerate a radical third-world leader like Kaddaffi if Reagan became president. These factors crossed my mind during the conversation. But I was not there to counsel on foreign policy. My meeting with Doe lasted about two hours. I left him talking with his other officials while Minister Kpor walked me down the stairs and said.
"Mr. Nyanfore, you could not have it better than that; despite the hard time you encountered, you saw the head of state in his private quarters with the vice chair and the justice minister. You made your position clear and delivered the message well."
He momentarily touched my shoulder as we walked down the stairs. Nyundweh Morkonmana was waiting for me; we left the mansion grounds. I returned to America shortly after to complete my thesis for my graduate education in Urban and Regional Planning from the University of the District of Columbia.
Let me also add that after my presentation to Doe, I asked him for a favor; to kindly look into the matter regarding a friend named Momo Roger. Momo was in prison with other True Whip Party officials jailed immediately after the coup. During that time in Liberia, family members and friends of the jailed officials were appealing to the PRC members and civilian officials to release the prisoners. Reportedly, it was stated that some family members offered money for the release.
Momo came from a poor background. He had no one to seek his interest, as I observed. Upon receipt of his master’s degree, he returned to Liberia and became assistant minister for information. As his friend, his situation concerned me. However, I wanted to avoid getting involved with politics. So, when planning to meet with Doe, I asked my aunt, with whom I was residing, for advice. She told me to speak diplomatically on Momo’s behalf.
"You would feel guilty later if you did not. Even if you unsuccessfully tried, your friend would appreciate your effort. Also, you would feel good inside", she added.
When I told Doe about Momo, Chea Cheapo quickly commented that, though Momo was new in the government, "he was not quiet. He was doing some unnecessary things affecting the progressives.
Doe asked me. "Is he Congo or native?"
"Native," I answered and added. "He is Vai."
"But how come he has Congo’s name? He asked while grinning.
Doe said they would investigate Momo’s case. I noticed Minister Kpor was writing when I was answering. I felt good, just as my aunt had said. In a few months, the government freed Momo. He later received a scholarship to do his doctorate in the US. Momo informed me in America that George Boley, who later became minister of education, told him I spoke to Doe concerning him.
Unfortunately, my friendship with Momo ended by his choice: I was calling him, and he was not. I wondered why. I asked a psychology expert about the possible reasons. She said that Momo may have blamed those whose advocacy brought the coup that made him lose his government post and imprisoned him.
"He may have suffered a lot in jail," she stated.
"Yes, I participated in the struggle and supported the coup; however, I spoke for him." I pointed out.
"It did not matter. He grouped you all in one boat", the expert further replied.
Upon attaining his Ph.D., Momo returned to Liberia. He became an official of the Sirleaf administration in the office of presidential affairs. We never spoke since he returned to Liberia. Momo and I became friends in 1969 in New York. He was doing his undergraduate in journalism. He introduced me to the late Tarty Teh, who, too, became my friend. Tarty was a natural-born writer and one of the most critics of President Ellen Johnson even before her presidency.
Additionally, regarding my trip to Liberia, Doe appeared relaxed, comfortable, and friendly in our meeting, as I stated. He asked me about my educational background and how long I had been in America. When I answered him, he said, smiling, "My man, 30 years is too long; you need to come home."
I was puzzled by Doe’s continual look at my shoes as I spoke. I was somewhat uncomfortable. But my shoes were new and well-polished. In diplomacy school, we were taught that one strategy to make an opponent uncomfortable was to look at their shoes at a meeting. The person would be uneasy and wonder what happened to the shoes. As humans, we do not usually look down when standing and sitting. The person facing us has the power to look at our feet. Again, my shoes were fine. But why was he looking? When I narrated the story to Veronica, his oldest daughter, she laughed, commenting, "Daddy may have liked your shoes; he liked fine clothing." She might be correct.
Doe was a good dresser in civilian clothing. According to a source, he admired Emmanuel Shaw’s dress style. "That boy can dress," he was quoted saying.
Emmanuel Shaw dressed impressively as a young man, even when he worked for Steve Tolbert after college. Raised by a single parent, he was a bright student at St. John mission school in Liberia. He once represented Liberia at an international youth conference. During the Tubman era in the 1960s, Liberians admired his fashionable Afro hairdo. He was considered Liberian Clarence Williams III, an American movie actor with an Afro. Like Shaw, Doe wore an Afro.
George Boley may have brought Shaw and others, including Willie Givens, to the mansion to work for Doe. The president appointed Shaw as minister of finance. He was an ally of Charles Taylor, and The Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) listed him for economic crime.
Shaw’s father was said to have been a Nigerian. Shaw’s mother operated a small business while residing down Lynch Street with Shaw and his younger siblings, Oswald, and Aleatha.
Doe’s comfort with me was also due to my name, Samuel K. Nyanfore. It was similar to his, Samuel K. Doe. When I first attempted to schedule a meeting with him, Mr. Samson, an assistant minister at the executive mansion, told me, "You and the head of state have the same name." Even when General Quiwonpka visited the US initially as a government official, he asked Tarty Teh, the Liberian Information officer in DC, about me. The general did not know my name but described me, saying, "The man has the same name as Doe."
B.M.W. Nagba, who was present, said, "That is Nyanfore, Samuel K. Nyanfore."
Quiwonpka said, "Yes, that’s him."
I could have kept the name to capitalize on it. But as I stated earlier, I changed it to my traditional African given name.
While the US government favored the coup, some institutions condemned the takeover. For instance, the Washington Post and the Evening Star in DC negatively criticized the overthrow. Concerned Liberians in the Diaspora had to defend the coup. I responded to the Post and the Star. They published my reply.

I showed Doe my reply to the paper and pictures of the demonstrations in the US against the Tolbert administration. Upon seeing and positively commenting, he passed them on to the ministers present. The response and the photos added to the comfort.

Before I met with Doe, the American company I consulted in Liberia met with Liberian business owners at the Ministry of Commerce. The company wanted to provide opportunities for Liberians to purchase American goods cheaper. The firm also desired to give Liberian businesses an advantage over foreign small businesses in Liberia. Many Liberian business owners attended. Samuel Jackson, Deputy Minister, chaired the meeting. After the event, Janice Williams, a company partner, commented on the picture of former Minister of Commerce John Sherman hanging on the wall. The photo was one of the pictures of previous ministers on the wall. She said that Sherman was a good-looking man.

A ministry staff member replied that the minister was late, and Sherman was among the officials executed during the coup. Janice was saddened. Within a week, one of the meeting attendants invited Janice, Wendell Robertson, and me to his house for dinner. After eating, Janice talked about John and asked the host why John was executed. The host, an African-American who apparently had naturalized in Liberia, said though sad that John died, John was corrupt.

He narrated that when he came to Liberia newly, he approached John to join him in a business to manufacture and sell wheelbarrows. John declined but would assist in processing the business documents in Liberia. For that help, he requested a considerable sum of money, though the business had yet to start.
"I told him no, I could not afford that kind of money," the host added, "but John suggested I give him a postdated check."
"Are you serious?" I told John.
"He was damn serious and insisted. So later, I wrote him the check. But he pressured me daily to put money in the account to cash the check. When I finally did, and he cashed the check that same day, he called me for a deal that would give me a government contract. I would give him another check. I refused. As I learned, I was not the only businessperson he was dealing with. He was doing business with Liberian and foreign businesspeople", the host ended.
The host further told us that John was so corrupt and greedy to the extent that John bravely took the postdated check.
"In America, you know, the authority will bury the official alive if he does that. The official would be foolish," the host said while his Liberian wife sat.
Janice and Wendell were stunned when they heard the story. I was embarrassed as a Liberian to hear that a fellow Liberian was that corrupt.

On our way back to the hotel, Janice could not get over what she had disappointedly heard about John. John Sherman was an intelligent student at CWA and was an upper schoolmate. John may have been the oldest child of his parents. He was serious, quiet, and responsible. His younger brother, Frederick, was my age and my friend. The children lived with their mother on Benson Street, Monrovia. John was a shining star in the Tolbert administration as the commerce minister. He held press conferences and was quoted in the papers as a committed, caring, and honest public official.

After the meeting with the commerce ministry, we met with the General Service Agency (GSA), which Charles Taylor headed then. He was unavailable, so we met with his Deputy, Blamo Nelson. The company wanted to sell goods to the agency for distribution within the government. Upon the company presentation and Nelson’s perusal of the company capability statement, Nelson stated that he did not know the firm.

Nevertheless, he knew me, my ability, and my personality. Because of that, he would give the company a contract to buy goods for the government. He repeated his statement. I was proud when he said that.
Another partner, Wendell, said, "Sam, Mr. Nelson spoke greatly about you. You are really an asset."
Wendell was my classmate at Georgetown University. He later became a lawyer. Janice was also a lawyer.

Blamo did not call me for a kickback, favor, or a friendly talk during and after my visit to Liberia. He served as a senator for Grand Kru County during Sirleaf’s administration. After the Senate, Sirleaf appointed him the Minister of Internal Affairs. I respect him highly.

Morkonmana became assistant minister of labor during the PRC rule. He also served as the Liberian House of Representatives speaker in Charles Taylor’s administration.
Now, let me return to events after my trip to Liberia. Several years later, Quiwonkpa came to Washington, DC, and offered me the Minister of Planning and Economic Affairs position to replace Dr. Byron Tarr, who had succeeded Tipoteh.

Upon my return to the US, I worked as a contractor with the US Department of Housing and Urban Development in its Office of Economic Affairs. Interestingly, Quiwonkpa made the offer after knowing my background briefly and encouraged me to return home. I did not respond immediately to the offer, even though it was real. My action of hesitating and not jumping on the offer right away was one of my best decisions. After a few months, Quiwonkpa and President Doe fell out. Quiwonkpa was no longer commander general. He and his family went into exile in the US. He died in the first invasion of Liberia.

I was surprised when I later learned that Quiwonkpa married a close relative. His wife, Tarloh Munah Quiwonkpa, is the daughter of my aunty, the late Mary Nyanfore Wilson. She raised Tarloh Barnes as a child in Maryland County. She was her second mother. In my telephone conversations with Quiwonkpa, we did not know this connection.

Doe was a quick learner, according to George Boley. Doe dropped out of high school before becoming head of state. Sawyer and others taught him at the Marcus Garvey night school in Monrovia in high school. He returned to school when he was head of state. Some of his classmates commented that Doe was an A student, taking leadership in class discussions. He wrote his senior thesis on Liberia-US relations.
Before and during the 1980s, former CIA agents spoke out on US covert activities in the third world. After my Liberian trip, I attended an ex-CIA high official lecture at George Washington University in Washington, DC. On the question about the Liberian coup, he stated that the US was not involved in the event based on his intelligence. He wondered, however, how the non-commissioned officers could undertake such a difficult and well-planned act.

The former agent’s answer did not imply that America could not have had information about the overthrow. The US may have decided not to intervene. From Doe’s narrative of the coup in the presence of Weh Seh at my meeting, along with the agent’s reply and other information, the view suggesting a direct US connection seems untrue. Also, Doe’s report confirmed that he did not actively participate in the takeover. As he said, he was the group leader and gave the order. Remember that Doe was negative with the US, so Weh Seh’s complaint was.

However, Niels Hahns’ article on American covert and overt operations in Liberia states that the US Embassy in Monrovia helped form the PRC government. Also, the United States placed its advisors in primary ministries immediately after the coup. Doe was said to have admired a US military officer called Colonel Gosney and advised that the Liberian military take orders from him. Accordingly, besides recognizing the takeover, the US provided military and economic support to the regime. America increased aid to Liberia from $20 million in 1979 to $500 million in 1985. The amount was the highest given to any other country in Sub-Sahara Africa.
Moreover, Herman Cohen, US Assistant Secretary of State, said the money was intended not to help the Liberian people but for other purposes, such as transforming Doe from a country boy to a "civilize Doe."

The article concludes that the US played a very light role in the PRC’s takeover.
The late Dr. Amos Sawyer, a MOJA founding member, viewed the rice protest and the coup as unnecessary. Other progressives shared this opinion, particularly regarding the coup. For example, Counselor Tiawon Gongloe, a former MOJA member, stated that the takeover brought sadness, and disappointment, depriving the progressives of taking power from the True Whip Party (TWP). He said that before the coup, President Tolbert had planned not to run for re-election in 1983. Accordingly, the plan would have given the progressives a political opportunity to gain power.

Contrary to this view is a mere wishful thought. Considering the Liberian state prior, whether Tolbert retired or not, the party would have prevented MOJA or PAL from taking office. Doing so would have been suicidal, for TWP’s power rested with government control. The organization would replace Tolbert with another member, perhaps a younger partisan. TWP had already started recruiting young and moderate members, chiefly from the indigenous section, into the party’s hierarchy. Moreover, Shad Tubman and AB Tolbert, sons of President Tubman and William Tolbert, respectively, were considering becoming presidents.

The elections of 1951 and 1955 should remind Gongloe and others of the party’s resistance to political change or multi-party democracy. They should also remember what happened in 1978: Amos Sawyer ran that year as an independent candidate for the mayor of Monrovia against TWP’s candidate Chu Chu Horton. Sawyer’s candidacy scared the True Whig Party government and united the progressives and the Monrovian downtrodden masses. It also galvanized the youth and sent a shocking wave to the political establishment. Fearing defeat, the party government required voters to have private property to qualify to vote, though the requirement was unconstitutional. When the voters protested, the government canceled the election. Thus, in other words, if the government could not permit a democratic change at the mayoral level, how could it allow a national regime change? Consequently, only radical means would have removed the government.

Some critics of the progressive movement charge that it failed to advance a leadership structure and a way forward despite its advocacy. While evidence supports this criticism, the progressives operated under challenging conditions. They sacrificed their youthful years for change. Before the 1970s, the True Whip Party government operated at will without regard to justice since 1878. It stopped other political parties in Liberia and made Liberia a one-party state.

Further, educated Liberians dared to question the government. They became lackeys. Thus, without the progressives’ effort and the military’s role, the regime would have probably still ruled Liberia, and the country would have remained a one-party state. Today, Liberians enjoy the multi-party democracy the progressives, and the military created. The progressives had done their share. The young Liberian generation needs to carry the torch with commitment and justice to the finish line.

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